What Will Putin Do?
Посилання на українську версію статті.
Since November, much of the world has been wondering whether Putin will launch a larger war against Ukraine. Depending on the source, Russia has 150,000+ troops around three sides of Ukraine. Including a reported 30,000 in Belarus near the Ukrainian border and a near blockade in the south. Despite Russian claims that they are exercises and that some forces have been sent back to their original bases, they are steadily increasing and moving closer to Ukraine.
It doesn’t matter what you or I believe is the best course of action for Russia. What matters most in this decision is what Vladimir Putin believes is best for Vladimir Putin first and Russia second. Everything and everyone else are a distant third or worse. In this paper, I attempt to consider the decision calculus from Putin’s perspective as best as I am able.
Early Alarms
The first curious piece of information that concerned me was the US intelligence reporting in October that Russia was preparing to amass 175,000 soldiers around Ukraine. This was reported at a time that Russian forces were less than half this size. The specific number of 175,000 seemed to indicate this came from intelligence on Russian plans. The fact that it was declassified would seem to indicate that it came from multiple independent sources. Otherwise, the source in Russia could have been compromised.
The next, even more concerning events were the Russian ultimatums to the US and NATO. Russia listed several impossible to accept conditions that would have given Russian essentially veto power over NATO. Removing NATO troops and missile launchers from the eastern European members. Prohibiting Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO. While the points of the ultimatums themselves might be discarded as simply the Russian wishlist and a beginning bargaining position, the insistence on a rapid decision and an all-or-nothing package made this different. These demands have been presented and repeatedly reinforced by Putin, Lavrov, and the rest of the gang. This is not the sign of someone who wants to negotiate. They are ultimatums that are expected to be rejected so the aggressor can claim justification.
Putin has been the only aggressor. NATO hasn’t expanded towards Russia since 2004. Up to 2014, NATO countries were reducing the size of their military forces in Europe. Most US and UK forces had left the European mainland. NATO forces only began growing after Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Putin knows this reality but tries to distract with this canard about NATO threatening Russia.
Russia’s limiting of the gas supply to Europe began in the spring of 2021. This was the beginning of a strategic maneuver to coerce Europe. Putin may even have planned to launch his offensive in early 2021. But realized that depleting European gas stocks and then launching his invasion during the heart of the winter heating season would be more effective. If this winter had been as cold as normal and the US not sent large LNG shipments, Europe would have almost no gas remaining in storage. Making Europe even more vulnerable than it is.
Probable Russian Grand Strategic Goals.
Create greater physical distance (strategic depth) between the Russian heartland and nearby powers.
Restore Russian hegemony over what they believe is their legitimate sphere of influence, the nations of the former Soviet Union.
Limit the power of the US led liberal international system which is naturally antagonistic toward authoritarian regimes.
Undermine and break up the political, economic, and military alliances of the West.
Grow the non-Muslim population in Russia to maintain Russian ethnic control of the nation.
Be seen as a great power and important powerbroker in the world.
Putin’s most important Grand Strategic goal is regime survival.
Putin’s Dilemma
Putin is in a very difficult position. Russia is dying, both demographically and economically. Authoritarian regimes cannot sustain economic growth on the level of free market nations. The lack of secure property rights inhibits the technological innovation that is a major driver of growth. People without faith in a better future stop having children or emigrate. Without better prospects, the Russian population will keep shrinking, further reducing economic and military power.
The liberal international order is a real threat to Putin and the Russian autocracy, and a large authoritarian power is a threat to the liberal nations of the world. The ease with which people, information, money, and goods can move around the world creates a different dynamic than even a generation ago. Cultures in contact will have influence on each other. With two incompatible cultures there will be conflict until one is eliminated or they evolve toward each other. Two out of three of those situations threaten Western personal freedoms, so the West must resist Russian political and economic cultural influence. While promoting democratic reforms in Russia.
Liberal democratic ideas undermine autocracies. But closing off a society from these ideas also closes out the greater technological progress and economic growth that accompanies individual liberty and democratic systems. The result is a growing power gap between autocracies and democracies. Putin knows that he cannot survive, and that Russia will continue to diminish in a liberal dominated world.
Power Balancing Between Democracies and Autocracies is an Obsolete Concept
Many commentators state that Putin feels threatened and is trying to rebalance the power relationship between Russia and the US, NATO, and EU. That he is seeking to create strategic depth between NATO and the Russian heartland. Some proponents of power balancing are even supportive of Russian efforts in a misguided effort to achieve a stable modus vivendi. But it is no longer possible for an autocracy to remain stable without complete isolation from the democratic world.
Balancing powers only remains relevant between authoritarian nations. It is a generation out of date in conflicts between democracies and autocracies. The global nature of information and technology access make this an obsolete foreign policy goal. The authoritarian nations cannot survive in the modern world with their peoples having access to and experience seeing and visiting major democracies in the world.
In earlier times, autocrats could limit access to information and limit the speed that information could spread. The ruling class had a considerable advantage over the common people in the transmission of information and the movement of people and goods. Today, the average person can communicate as quickly as government officials and can often do so through private, encrypted means. The people have ready access to extremely large amounts of detailed information about the world. When someone objects to an absurd law or regulation, corruption, or unfair treatment, it is easier to join in protest with like-minded people. In a democracy this is considered healthy discourse. But in an autocracy, any objection to officialdom is considered a threat to the regime that must be countered.
Putin must know by now that Russia cannot sustain competition with free market economies. Not in economic power nor military power. Outside of oil, gas, and nuclear weapons, Russia would have little power. As an autocracy, Russia has few good options. Fracturing Western cohesion is necessary for Russia to be successful by allowing it to deal with countries bilaterally instead of as part of the EU or NATO. Equally important is undermining individual rights in other countries so they don’t grow in power faster than Russia and to reduce the drive for freedom in Russia. The alternatives are political and economic collapse or a liberal transformation of Russia. Both of which threaten the Putin regime.
Unfortunately, Europe has been complacent about the Russian threat. Believing that Putin can be responded to like a democrat. Democracies can have liberal international relations (IR) with each other but must have realist IR with autocracies. Liberal IR only works between liberal nations. Autocrats can speak the liberal language but are unable to act as liberals. So, it is foolish to try to relate to them as liberals. Autocrats reached the top with a different worldview and won’t change what has worked to bring them to the pinnacle of power in their own country. They are more likely to double down on what has worked before.
Lack of Trust
The liberal international order is not held together by institutions like the UN, World Bank, IMF, and others. Trust is the currency of the liberal international order. Only trust can hold it together. Presently, Germany is losing the trust of its neighbors and allies.
The Nord Stream pipelines indicate that Germany doesn’t trust the nations between Germany and Russia. The Ukrainian pipelines have the capacity to move the gas of NS1 and NS2 plus more. The NS pipelines are not needed to move additional gas to Germany or the EU. Russia wants the ability to isolate and divide the European nations, especially Ukraine and Germany. Ukraine to return it to Russian control. Germany to separate the leader and most powerful economy in the EU from its EU and NATO relationships. This has become possible because Germany doesn’t want to be inconvenienced by Russian conflicts with its neighbors. Why should Putin believe they will let themselves be inconvenienced by a further Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Putin’s Leverage Over Europe
Putin has more leverage over Europe than he has ever had and is likely to ever have in the future. Every country in NATO has already said that NATO forces will not fight in Ukraine. Europe has allowed themselves to become dependent on Russian gas. Gazprom, a foreign adversary-controlled company has been permitted to own significant parts of the gas storage system. They did not fill these reservoirs in preparation for the 2021-2022 heating season.
Germany is almost singlehandedly giving Putin the rope to hang the European Union. Or at least a German led EU. After Russia destroys the Ukrainian pipeline, how do German leaders tell the German people that they will not use the Nord Stream Two (NS2) pipeline? When that means the shutdown of substantial parts of the German economy. The answer is, they won’t! They will take the gas. Causing either a rupture with much of the rest of the EU or a unified end of sanctions against Russia. Germany has one chance to demonstrate to Russia that they sincerely want the Ukrainian pipeline to remain viable. The only way is to destroy substantial parts of NS2 before Russia does the same to the Ukrainian pipeline. But Germany is too selfish to do this.
Germany and the EU are vulnerable to even more coercion. In 2019, Russia exported $123 billion of crude oil, $66.2 billion of refined oil products, and $26.3 billion of natural gas. Russia has $630 billion in gold and foreign reserves and is projected to have $1.778 trillion in GDP in 2022. Gas is predominately used for electricity and heat. No other energy source can quickly replace it. Russia can shut off just the gas to Europe in retaliation for sanctions and lose only a small part of its revenues. But the loss of that gas will have a major impact on Europe that could cause rolling blackouts and force many factories to shut down. Resulting in a sustained recession until energy levels are brought back up.
Germany and likely some other EU nations are not going to go along with severe sanctions if Russia threatens to retaliate with a suspension of gas deliveries. Russia has made a point of only fulfilling long-term contracts in Europe. They have declined to sell gas on the spot market. Russia’s Gazprom did not refill the gas storage sites they own in the EU after the last heating season. Some analysts think this was only done to pressure countries to agree to more long-term contracts or to gain certification of NS2 quicker. That might be plausible if Russia wasn’t also massing troops on the Ukrainian border.
Putin doesn’t believe Germany will take a strong stand against Russia for a major invasion of Ukraine because he doesn’t believe German leaders will place any sanctions on Russia that would also have difficult consequences for Germany. If Germany will not go along with the mother-of-all-sanctions-regimes promised by President Biden and EU leaders, it will seriously weaken transatlantic and intra-European relations.
Putin is exploiting German vulnerability, but it is Germany’s fault that Putin has this opportunity. The German fantasy that history has ended, and trade and diplomacy can settle all geopolitical conflicts is quite naive. Russia and China are reteaching that raw autocratic power must be countered with military power for economic and diplomatic power to be effective. Most of the EU and NATO have been warning Germany for years that NS2 is a threat to Ukraine and the EU. But it has fallen on deaf ears.
Or perhaps it is not naivete but calculated cynicism. It is difficult to believe that experienced leaders of the largest economy in the EU could fail to foresee the geopolitical implications of NS2. In which case, Germany has allied itself with an autocratic adversary of freedom against its own claimed allies in the EU and NATO. Unreliable and untrustworthy would be the polite description of this. Traitorous is less polite but equally accurate. German leaders have selfishly moved forward with NS2 to secure direct energy supplies from Russia without concern about the consequences to the countries between Germany and Russia.
But it can get worse. What will they do when Putin isn’t satisfied with no new sanctions but insists upon the removal of existing sanctions? Or limits the sharing of gas with other EU countries that support Ukraine? Or requires open access to technology? Or the end of all support to Ukraine for the privilege of buying gas? Over time, Europe can replace Russian energy but how much damage will occur in the meantime?
Putin’s Leverage Over Ukraine
The strongest leverage Putin can achieve over Ukraine is a sustained placement of Russian artillery on the outskirts of Kyiv, Dnipro, and the other cities along the Dnipro River. Seizing Ukraine east of the Dnipro River but staying out of the large cities on the east bank. This would provide a stronger defensive line along the river for most of its length. Staying out of the large cities will reduce the manpower needed for an occupation. Placing a defensive line like currently exists in the Donbass along this line would place 30 percent of the Ukrainian population behind Russian lines and another 25 percent within artillery range.
In addition to decapitating the national leadership, the early goals of the Russian attack will be to destroy or capture most of the regular Ukrainian military. Especially any forces east of the Dnipro River or capable of counterattacking east of the river. They will be seeking battle with the Ukrainian Army with the goal of fixing brigades in place to envelope them. Pounding them with artillery and air attacks. If they can destroy the bulk of the Ukrainian armored vehicles, it will be easier to systematically clear the occupied regions of partisans and Territorial Defense Forces. As leverage to make Kyiv assist in blocking support for resistance in the east, Russia will likely use “punishment reprisals” against Kyiv, Dnipro, and the local people where Russians are attacked in the east. Further pressure will be exerted by providing poor living conditions in camps for captured Ukrainian soldiers and the pro-Ukrainian people rounded up by the Russian National Guard. Including the families of Territorial Defense Force soldiers. Modern gulags used to pressure Kyiv to agree to Russian demands. While also removing potential partisans from the occupied regions.
Compounding the problem will be the seizure of major parts of the Ukrainian economy. Kharkiv and Mariupol would be occupied. Zaporizhzhya is one of the large cities on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River that the Russians may prefer to occupy in order to secure the Motor Sich engine production capabilities. (Though they may “sell” the company and move it to Russia.) The Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant is south of the city in Enerhodar. It is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and is on the east bank. Artillery within range of Kyiv and Dnipro will reduce investment and likely cause the movement of facilities west or out of Ukraine. Control of the east side of several major dams could also occur. Unless Ukraine builds or acquires many more anti-ship missiles, Russia will have the naval power to impose a blockade of the Ukrainian coast.
The Russian plan will be to exert pressure with continued air and artillery attacks until Ukraine agrees to a ceasefire under Russian conditions. A Minsk III from hell. Instead of a static frontline in the Donbass it will be on the Dnipro River and the outskirts of Kyiv, Dnipro, Cherkasy, Kremenchuk, and Kherson. If there are partisan attacks in the occupied regions, these cities will receive retaliatory artillery attacks. This is the most practical scenario for Putin to achieve and maintain long-term leverage.
Calculus of an Autocrat
In 1939, Hitler was informed that Germany would soon run out of foreign reserves if Germany didn't switch part of their military manufacturing to consumer goods. They would no longer be able to buy the oil, food, and other commodities they needed to sustain the nation or the rearmament program. Germany risked economic collapse if a change didn't occur soon.
Hitler also knew that his aggressive strategy to take Austria and Czechoslovakia had scared Germany's neighbors. Most were improving their defenses. Producing more weapons and increasing the size of their military. Hitler knew his window of opportunity was closing. Germany couldn't out produce all their neighbors.
Hitler had made his goal of Lebensraum known long before 1939 but most people didn't think it was realistic. They dismissed the idea that Hitler would take such incredible risks. But it is dangerous to ignore or dismiss the goals of dictators even when they are highly risky for themselves and their country. Their risk calculus is different than for leaders of democracies. They matured in a more cutthroat, more anarchic environment. While electoral competition in democracies can be fierce, the losers don't have to worry about prison or death as a consequence of losing.
Putin has repeatedly made his goal of conquering Ukraine clear. He will use every opportunity available to move in this direction. He has sought to undermine Ukraine in many ways. These efforts have hardened Ukrainians against Putin and Russia. Despite Putin’s efforts, Ukraine has been slowly but steadily reforming. Revealing the lie that Slavic people and democracy are incompatible. That they need to be controlled by a strongman. The UA military has been slowly improving and increasing its capabilities. Making delay in regaining control of Ukraine increasingly difficult and dangerous.
In this latest round of tensions, Putin has dramatically shown his aggressive nature and pushed his neighbors to the brink repeatedly. If he backs down without a significant gain, he will look weak and foolish. His actions, so far, have pushed Ukraine further away, brought more NATO troops to the Russian border. It has encouraged even US Democrats to push for more oil and gas drilling to produce and export more. European nations are seeking alternative sources of energy. These reactions will erode oil and gas prices, reduce Russian market share, and diminish the Russian economy.
Will Putin Launch a Large Invasion of Ukraine?
Only Putin knows for sure, but I believe the chances are greater than 95 percent that he will launch a major invasion soon. He has more leverage against Germany and the EU now than he is ever likely to have again. No other country is going to send their military to help defend Ukraine. Ukraine is steadily getting stronger, closer to the West, and more resistant to Russian disinformation and coercion.
Because of the brittleness of the Russian economy and political system in the modern globalized environment, I have believed since 2015 that a major Russian invasion would eventually occur. Putin’s ultimatums in early December moved the odds from 50/50 for the coming year to a 60 percent chance this winter. By mid-January, I believed the chances were at 80 percent in the next few weeks. By early February, I believed it would be February 20th, plus or minus five days. Absent a coup in Moscow, the invasion will probably begin in the next few days.
It is impossible to know how effective the Ukrainian military will be against the Russian military. A comparison of equipment lists is not sufficient. The skill, courage, and stubbornness of the soldiers and commanders will be tested. The Ukrainian national resistance, Territorial Defense Forces, and the other reserves will take time to bring to bear against the Russian forces. The longer that interval is, the more likely that Russia can succeed. It is likely that Putin and his generals discount the value of these types of light resistance forces. They have usually not worked well against ruthless autocracies with well-organized security forces.
The weak-kneed behavior of most Western leaders in recent years also encourages Putin. He knows that they will go to great lengths to avoid a war. He knows they will not support sanctions that harm themselves. The most impactful sanctions against Russia would also greatly impact Europe. So, he is not afraid of severe sanctions. The US will find it difficult to sustain tough sanctions without the support of the European and Asian allies who buy Russian gas and oil. The US does very little trade with Russia so will have little impact on its own.
Not only is Russia not likely to be financially impaired by sanctions, but Putin also has a strong opportunity to fracture the EU and possibly NATO. At a minimum, if he doesn’t attack, his power will decline. But the extent to which he has pushed the world to the brink of war, he risks being deposed if he doesn’t achieve something great. Why wouldn’t he roll the dice? Nobody has made a serious effort to stop him. Now it will be up to the Ukrainian people to do so.
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